基于破裂风险的产品进出口博弈分析A bargaining model with a risk of breakdown of commodity import and export
张雪峰,严梦垠,黄倩
摘要(Abstract)：
本文构建了一个产品购买的动态讨价还价博弈模型,讨论了在具有贴现因子及破裂风险影响下均衡的变化,通过对破裂风险主观概率的改进,得到了唯一的子博弈精炼均衡,并讨论了该均衡概念在改善贸易时中国"被动性"问题中的应用,研究发现:具有耐心的交易将获得更大的预期收益;均衡利润分配依据双方贴现率、对谈判破裂风险的主观概率以及破裂点的不同;产品提供方在面临谈判破裂更看重自己主观概率时,对之前的主观概率越依赖,所要求的均衡价格越高。
关键词(KeyWords)： 产品;破裂风险;讨价还价;子博弈精炼均衡;被动性
基金项目(Foundation): 京津冀地区大气污染治理的联控机制研究(项目编号2016000020124G021);; 北方工业大学优势(建设)学科项目(项目编号:XN081)
作者(Author): 张雪峰,严梦垠,黄倩
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